Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
Volume 17

Issue 1

Article 5

1-18-2018

The Road to Marshall: Of Venue, Trolls, and the Eastern District of
Texas
Jesus Efren Cano

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jesus E. Cano, The Road to Marshall: Of Venue, Trolls, and the Eastern District of Texas, 17 Chi. -Kent J.
Intell. Prop. 137 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol17/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

THE ROAD TO MARSHALL: OF VENUE, TROLLS, AND THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JESUS EFREN CANO
I.ALL ABOARD!: THE CRAZED TRIP AHEAD .................................... 138
II.THE PASSENGERS AND THE GOLDEN TICKET: BACKGROUND ON
PATENT INFRINGEMENT VENUE AND THE ENTITIES WHO
CHOOSE IT .............................................................................. 140
A. Crossing the Bridge: The Patent Troll Issue ................... 140
B. The Texan Patent Express: The Eastern District of Texas
141
C. The Fork in the Yellow Brick Road: § 1391 or § 1400(b)?
143
A. Stopping the Bullet Train: The VENUE Act .................. 149
III.EVALUATING THE HIGHWAY: ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT AND
PROPOSED VENUE LAWS ....................................................... 151
A. But First, the Other Roads: Other Special Venue Statutes
and Their Functionality .................................................. 151
B. Road Construction: The Difference Between § 1400(b) and
the Other Special Venue Statutes ................................... 154
C. Pushing the Limits: How the VENUE Act is Pushing the
Boundaries ...................................................................... 156
1. “I Think You Are In My Seat”: Imposing On the
Plaintiffs.................................................................... 156
2. Wasn’t That the Conductor’s Job?: The VENUE Act
and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Role.......... 158
IV.THE GPS SYSTEM: A GUIDE TO THE ROAD AHEAD .................... 159
A. “Redirecting . . . :” Adjusting the Route, Justly ............. 159
1. Is This the Wrong Map?: Maybe Patent Infringement Is
Not That Special ....................................................... 159
2. Who Needs A Map When You Have A GPS? .......... 160
B. Dealing With the Unruly Passengers .............................. 161
V.THE END OF THE ROAD: CONCLUDING THE JOURNEY .................. 163
137

138

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

I.

Vol 17:1

ALL ABOARD!: THE CRAZED TRIP AHEAD

Just two hours east of Dallas, Texas along Interstate 20 lies the small
town of Marshall, Texas.1 Marshall is home to the East Texas Baptist
University Tigers, boxer George Foreman, and 24,500 people.2 Despite its
small size, Marshall played a tremendous role in allowing the Eastern
District of Texas to make a name for itself. That name, of course, is the
“Rocket Docket.”3 As the district hears more than half of the nation’s patent
infringement cases, there is a reason for the Eastern District’s fame.4
On September 15, 2016, a jury in Tyler, Texas, just a half hour west of
Marshall, awarded $22 million to Cellular Communications Equipment,
LLC in a patent infringement suit against Apple Incorporated.5 This instance
is not the first time a jury in the Eastern District of Texas has awarded this
amount in damages.6 In fact, this occurs quite frequently.7 Jury verdicts like
these have brought companies just like Cellular Communications all the way
to Marshall and Tyler.8 The Eastern District is not the only venue that is
popular among these types of businesses, but it hears the most patent
litigation from companies like Cellular Communications.9
Acacia Research, Cellular Communications’ parent company, is quite
successful. Since refocusing its business plan in 2000, it has generated $1.3

1. See Driving Directions from Dallas, TX to Marshall, TX, GOOGLE MAPS,
https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Dallas,+TX/Marshall,+TX/@32.5832455,-96.7093053,8z
(search
starting point field for “Dallas, TX” and search destination field for “Marshall, TX”).
2. See About, EAST TEXAS BAPTIST UNIVERSITY, https://www.etbu.edu/about (last visited Jan. 19,
2017).
3. Loren
Steffy,
Patently
Unfair,
TEX.
MONTHLY
(Oct.
2014),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/patently-unfair.
4. See generally 2015 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW REPORT, LEX MACHINA (Mar. 16,
2016), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/2015-patent-litigation-year-in-review-report.
5. See Marc Schneider, Apple Hit With $22 Million Verdict in Latest ‘Patent Troll’ Case,
BILLBOARD (Sept. 21, 2016) http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7518025/apple-hit-with-22million-verdict-in-latest-patent-troll-case.
6. CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: ARE
WE AT AN INFLECTION POINT? 15 (2016), available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensicservices/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
7. See generally id.
8. See generally id.
9. See 2015 PATENT DISPUTE REPORT, UNIFIED PATENTS (Dec. 31, 2015),
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-dispute-report; see also 2015 PATENT
LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 4.
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billion in revenue.10 They do not provide any services.11 Acacia Research,
instead, litigates and licenses patents.12 This business plan has proven to be
truly polarizing, as some companies have adopted it, while others have
condemned it.13 This business model is so controversial that it has started a
persistent wave of patent reform legislation in Congress just to stop it.14
One of the major ways that those who oppose this type of business
model are attempting to use to slow down companies like Acacia Research
is to prevent them from bringing cases in the Eastern District of Texas.15 The
latest attempts to keep cases out of the Eastern District of Texas involve
changing the procedural rules, particularly the special venue rule for patent
infringement, to disallow most of the cases that the district hears.16
This Comment explores the litigation and legislation revolving around
nonpracticing entities such as Acacia Research and their favorite forum for
a patent duel, the Eastern District of Texas. Part II gives a brief orientation
to the world of non-practicing entities, describing the different types and
their differing intentions. This section will also give a brief introduction into
exactly why the Eastern District of Texas is so popular for patent
infringement litigation, proposed patent venue legislation, and the conflict
between two current venue statutes. These two statutes will be the main focus
of this Comment due to their potential impact on litigation in the Eastern
District as well as on nonpracticing entities. Part III will evaluate the special
venue statute for patent infringement and explore the situations that give rise
to other special venue statutes for comparison. Part IV will discuss a twopart solution to the issues relating to the special venue statute and aggressive
nonpracticing entities. This two-part solution involves repealing the current
special venue statute for patent infringement to rely solely on the general
venue statute and incentivizing inventors to assign their patents to operating
companies.

10. See generally Overview, ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., http://acaciaresearch.com/aboutus/#overview (last visited Jan. 19, 2017); see also History, ACACIA RESEARCH CORP.,
http://acaciaresearch.com/history/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
11. See generally id.
12. See generally id.
13. See generally Patent Trolls, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/resourcespatent-troll-victims (last visited Jan. 19, 2017); see also Ira Blumberg, Why Patent Trolls Won’t Give Up,
TECH CRUNCH, (June 5, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/05/why-patent-trolls-wont-give-up/.
14. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015); Trade Protection Not Troll Protection
Act, H.R. 4829, 114th Cong. (2016); Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act, H.R. 2045, 114th Cong.
(2015).
15. See, e.g., H.R. 9; Venue Equality and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act, S. 2733, 114th Cong.
(2016) (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 17, 2016).
16. Id.
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THE PASSENGERS AND THE GOLDEN TICKET: BACKGROUND
ON PATENT INFRINGEMENT VENUE AND THE ENTITIES WHO
CHOOSE IT
A. Crossing the Bridge: The Patent Troll Issue

Nonpracticing entities (NPEs), often known as patent trolls, are
business entities that do not make or create products that use, or “practice,”
the patents that they hold.17 These can include research entities that are
involved in commercial or educational research and development and take
out patents to protect their research.18 These research entities then license the
patented technology to help fund other research and to facilitate technology
transfer.19 However, there are NPEs whose sole business model revolves
around patent licensing and litigation instead of producing and selling
products.20 The end-goal of this model is to have other companies license the
patent, often with the threat of expensive and potentially lengthy litigation.21
This model can be very lucrative.22 For example, Company A is in the
business of producing tires for cars and has discovered a great new design
for such tires. An NPE who owns a patent for a similar, if not the exact,
design can bring an infringement suit against Company A. Faced with the
average cost of litigation ranging from $1 million to $6 million, Company A
would be forced to negotiate a license from the NPE or abandon the design
altogether.23
These types of NPEs usually structure themselves as shell companies
where the NPE distributes money to other entities.24 So if Company A were
to get a judgment against the NPE, it is likely that the NPE would not have

17. See Nonpracticing Entity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a
nonpracticing entity as a “person or company that acquires patents with no intent to use, further develop,
produce, or market the patented invention”).
18. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 327 (2010) (“A research and development
entity is a non-practicing patentee that develops its own technology.”).
19. See id.
20. Robin Feldman, The Pace of Change: Non-practicing Entities and the Shifting Legal
Landscape, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 635, 636 (2015) [hereinafter The Pace of Change]. Businesses that actually
make and sell products are known as operating companies. See 2015 Patent Dispute Report, UNIFIED
PATENTS (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-dispute-report
(defining an operating company as a “[c]ompany which derives most of its total revenue from Product
Sales or Services.”).
21. See The Pace of Change, supra note 20, at 636–37.
22. Id. at 636.
23. Report of the Economic Survey 2007, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, LAW PRAC. MGMT. COMM.,
at I-91 (2007).
24. The Pace of Change, supra note 20, at 636.
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assets available to pay it. This situation results in pressure for operating
companies to either purchase a license from the NPE or settle if the NPE is
asserting its patent rights against the company.25
NPEs have seen increasing litigation in the past few years. In 2007,
NPEs filed roughly 25% of all patent lawsuits.26 This number rose to nearly
60% in 2012.27 As such, there have been attempts to reduce the number of
suits brought by NPEs through different procedural rules. One attempt was
in the America Invents Act (AIA) which, among other things, changed the
joinder rules in patent cases.28 The AIA limits joinder of defendants if the
plaintiff is seeking joint or several relief, or if the claims against each
defendant arise out of the same transaction.29 In certain jurisdictions before
the AIA, plaintiffs could join multiple defendants if deciding the patent’s
scope would provide sufficient basis for the joinder, even if the individual
infringements were not related.30 This new joinder rule, however, was not
effective as NPEs still brought a majority of patent infringement cases in the
United States. The method to limit NPEs shifted to a different procedural
matter—venue. This shift was caused by the overwhelming number of suits
brought in one particular forum.
B. The Texan Patent Express: The Eastern District of Texas
Despite there being ninety-four federal districts that have jurisdiction to
hear these patent cases, about half of the patent cases filed in 2015—2,541
of 5,819 cases—occurred in the Eastern District of Texas.31 This massive
number of filings made the Eastern District the top venue for patent disputes
in 2015.32 NPEs were responsible for filing about 95% of these cases while
operating companies—ones that produce products—made up only 5%.33 So,
why are NPEs flocking to the Eastern District?
The Eastern District of Texas has developed a reputation for being
plaintiff-friendly in patent litigation cases. The Eastern District is also known

25. Id.
26. Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, 2013
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2014) [hereinafter The AIA 500].
27. Id.
28. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, § 299(a).
29. Id.
30. The AIA 500, supra note 26, at 43.
31. 2015 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 4.
32. 2015 PATENT DISPUTE REPORT, supra note 9.
33. Id.
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for having generous juries and procedural rules that favor patent holders.34
This reputation came about because of one federal district judge in Marshall,
Texas.35
In the mid-1980’s, Texas Instruments (TI) was nearing bankruptcy and
decided to generate more revenue by suing other technology giants for patent
infringement of different patents in its patent portfolio.36 TI successfully
litigated these suits and began generating about $400 million a year from this
practice.37 However, in the early 1990s, TI’s hometown district court, the
Northern District of Texas in Dallas, had a docket clogged with criminal drug
cases that slowed the progress of TI’s patent infringement cases.38 Luckily,
venue law regarding patent infringement in the early 1990s allowed TI to
select a different venue as long as TI met certain conditions.39 In taking
advantage of this venue standard, TI searched and found a suitable forum in
the Eastern District of Texas court in Marshall, Texas.40 At the time, criminal
cases on the docket in Marshall comprised only about 10% of the total
docket.41 Subsequently, TI filed its first patent infringement case in the
Eastern District of Texas in 1992.42 Happy with the results of the case, TI
continued to file cases in Marshall.43 One such case was against Hyundai,
who appointed then-lawyer T. John Ward to defend them.44 Mr. Ward’s loss
in this case, in conjunction with experience in patent cases as a federal judge,
shaped his view of how these cases should be adjudicated.45
Judge T. John Ward set rules to expedite patent cases, such as limiting
the number of pages lawyers could file in their motions, setting strict
timetables for hearings, and establishing strict time restrictions during
presentations in the courtroom.46 Judge Ward’s reasoning behind these rules
was simple: once three or four major claims have been decided, the rest will
follow the same pattern.47 Other judges in the district followed suit.48 These
34. Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation and
Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 43 (2010).
35. Steffy, supra note 3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See discussion infra Part II.C.
40. Steffy, supra note 3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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rules led to expedited cases and, with plaintiff-friendly juries, subsequently
led to the Eastern District’s reputation as one of the most desirable courts in
the nation to bring patent lawsuits.49
This plaintiff-friendly reputation has led to many NPEs filing their
patent infringement cases in the Eastern District.50 This decision usually pays
off for NPEs, as the Eastern District’s juries on average deliver a patent
infringement judgment around $9.4 million.51 If broken down even further,
to individual judges in the Eastern District Court, Judge Rodney Gilstrap—
who hears the most patent cases—has an average award of $15 million per
case, with the second highest plaintiff success rate in the nation.52 Judge Ron
Clark has an average award of $6.9 million, with a 73% plaintiff success
rate.53 These conditions are so desirable that, when facing a potential venue
restriction in 2016, NPEs rushed to file in the Eastern District midway
through 2015.54 It is because NPEs strive for these conditions so aggressively
that lawmakers want to restrict the current venue laws controlling patent
infringement cases.
C. The Fork in the Yellow Brick Road: § 1391 or § 1400(b)?
The general venue statutes controlling civil cases in federal courts can
be found in Title 28, Chapter 87 of the U.S. Code.55 In 1897, Congress passed
an act that specifically addressed venue in patent infringement cases.56 This
act can now be found under § 1400(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code.57 Thus,
there are two statutes that may control venue in patent infringement cases
under Title 28: § 1400(b) and § 1391.58 Specifically, § 1400(b) states: “Any
civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of

49. Id. The Eastern District of Texas has the highest success rate for plaintiffs in the nation at 54%
and has a median damages award value of $9.4 million. See CHRIS BARRY ET AL., 2016 Patent Litigation
Study: Are We at an Inflection Point?, PWC (May 2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensicservices/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
50. BARRY ET AL., supra note 49.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 17.
53. Id.
54. RPX RATIONAL PATENT, 2015 NPE ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTS 9 (Mar. 21, 2016), available at
https://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/RPX-2015-NPE-Activity-HighlightsFinalZ.pdf.
55. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1390–1413 (2011).
56. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (An Act defining the jurisdiction of the US
District Courts for cases involving infringement of patents).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
58. See generally id. §§ 1391(b), 1400(b).
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infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”59 Section
1391(b) allows for a proper venue for a civil action in any forum in which
the defendant resides.60 Section 1391(c)(2) defines residency for businesses
as:
An entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common
name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated,
shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial
district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in
question and, if a plaintiff, only in the judicial district in
which it maintains its principal place of business.61
Section § 1400(b) is deemed to be specific to patent infringement cases,
while § 1391(b) is a more general venue provision.62 The conflict between
the two provisions first appeared before the Supreme Court in 1957.63
In Fourco v. Transmirra, Transmirra Products Corporation sued Fourco
Glass Company, a West Virginia corporation, in the Southern District of
New York for patent infringement.64 Although Fourco had a regularly
established place of business within the Southern District, it moved to
dismiss due to lack of proper venue on the basis that none of the alleged
infringement occurred there.65 The District Court interpreted § 1400(b) to be
solely controlling over patent infringement cases and, based on no showing
that Fourco infringed in New York, granted the motion for dismissal.66 The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 1391(c) controls the definition of
the term “corporate residence” found in § 1400(b).67 When read together, the
Court of Appeals held that the statutes allowed Fourco to be sued in New
York where the company conducts business.68 The United States Supreme
Court began its analysis by revisiting Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd
Co., a case involving the issue of whether a venue statute applying

59. Id. § 1400(b).
60. Id. § 1391(b).
61. Id. § 1391(c)(2).
62. Andrew Williams, In re TC Heartland (Fed. Cir. 2016), PATENT DOCS (May 5, 2016),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2016/05/in-re-tc-heartland-fed-cir-2016.html.
63. See generally Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
64. Id. at 223.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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specifically to patent infringement was the sole governing provision for
venue in those cases.69 The Court held in Stonite that Congress’ intention in
passing the specific venue statute for patent infringement cases was to
provide venue jurisdiction not for all civil litigation, but for patent
infringement cases specifically.70 Barring any substantive change by
Congress in the statute, the Court held that the specific venue statute,
§ 1400(b), is controlling over the general statute, § 1391(c).71
Congress quickly responded to the Court’s ruling in Fourco shortly
after the decision.72 In 1988, Congress amended § 1391(c) to read “[f]or
purposes of venue in this chapter” at the beginning of the paragraph.73 The
legislative history revealed Congress’ concern with a party’s residence for
venue consideration, particularly a corporation’s residence.74 The main
worry was the breadth of “residence” that a multidistrict corporation would
have for venue consideration under the then § 1391(c), where a corporation
could be said to reside anywhere that it was “incorporated, licensed to do
business, or doing business.”75 The committee in charge of the Act concluded
that a corporation’s residence should be limited to forums where the
corporation availed itself of the forum’s personal jurisdiction.76 For
multidistrict corporations not incorporated or licensed to do business in a
specific forum, this means restricting venue to districts in which the
corporation confines its activities.77
Shortly after the amendment, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit heard VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.78 VE Holding
sued Johnson Gas Appliance in two separate suits in California for direct and
contributory infringement and inducement to infringe the VE patents.79
Johnson, an Iowa company, moved for dismissal in each suit due to improper
venue.80 The Northern District of California granted the motions, holding
that Johnson did not ““reside”“ in the district according to the definition

69. Id. at 224.
70. Id. at 225.
71. Id.
72. Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4669
(codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988)).
73. Id. § 1013.
74. See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-889 (1998), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6031.
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 70.
76. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 70.
77. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 70.
78. See generally VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
abrogated by TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
79. Id. at 1576.
80. Id.
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under § 1400(b), rejecting VE Holding’s argument that the 1988 amendment
to § 1391(c) redefined the term “reside” in § 1400(b).81 VE Holding appealed
each dismissal, and the Federal Circuit subsequently consolidated the
appeals.82
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s reliance
on the non-specific language of § 1391(c) and Congress’ subsequent
amendment to the provision.83 Congress’ addition of the beginning phrase
clarified the previous ambiguity in § 1391(c) and clearly stated the provision
was to be used for all venue purposes under chapter 87, including
§ 1400(b).84 The Federal Circuit found that the words of the newly amended
statute were clear and unambiguous, so as not to require inquiry into
congressional intent.85 Despite this finding, the court addressed the lack of
legislative history concerning how the amendment to § 1391(c) would affect
§ 1400(b).86 The court further stated that the silence in the legislative history
does not detract from the clear meaning of the amended § 1391(c).87 The
circuit court held that § 1391(c) expressly reads itself into and only defines
a term in § 1400(b).88 As such, the Federal Circuit concluded that § 1391(c)
governed what “resides” means in § 1400(b).89 This holding lowered the
standard for venue in patent infringement cases to any forum that has
personal jurisdiction over the defendants.90
In response to this ruling, Congress passed the Federal Courts
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act in December of 2011.91 It made two
changes regarding venue: the Act, (1) added “[f]or all venue purposes,” to
§ 1391(c), and, (2) § 1391(a) was amended to say “[a]pplicability of section
— except as otherwise provided by law.”92 The congressional intent of this
amendment to § 1391(a) was to follow law—current at the time of the
amendment—regarding requirements for general venue choices.93 The
purpose was clear, though, to not displace special venue rules under

81. Id.
82. Id. at 1575–76.
83. Id. at 1578.
84. Id. at 1578–79.
85. Id. at 1579–80.
86. Id. at 1581.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1579.
89. Id. at 1581.
90. Williams, supra note 62.
91. See generally Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, H.R. 394, 112th
Cong. (2011).
92. Id.
93. H.R. REP. NO. 112-10 (2011).
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particular federal statutes.94 Congress also made it clear that § 1391(c) was
to apply to all federal venue statutes.95
The courts’ struggle with patent venue continued in In re TC
Heartland.96 Kraft Foods Group (Kraft), a Delaware-incorporated and
Illinois-based company, sued TC Heartland, an Indiana-based company, in
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.97 Kraft alleged that TC
Heartland infringed on three Kraft patents with its water enhancer products.98
TC Heartland moved for either dismissal for improper venue, or transfer to
the Southern District of Indiana.99
At the district court, TC Heartland argued that it was not licensed to
do business in Delaware, that it had no presence in Delaware, and that it had
not entered into supply contracts in Delaware, or otherwise availed itself of
Delaware’s jurisdiction.100 TC Heartland did admit to shipping some of the
accused products into Delaware based on national accounts rather than local
ones.101 The magistrate judge determined that the court had specific personal
jurisdiction over TC Heartland in claims arising from the accused products
in Delaware.102 The judge further rejected TC Heartland’s argument that
Congress’ 2011 amendment to § 1391 nullified the Federal Circuit’s holding
in VE Holding Corp.103 The district court adopted the magistrate’s position
in all aspects, and denied TC Heartland’s motions.104
On appeal to the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus, TC
Heartland had two arguments: that it did not “reside” in Delaware for
§ 1400(b), and that the Delaware district court lacked specific personal
jurisdiction over it.105 Regarding venue, TC Heartland argued that the
Federal Circuit’s holding in VE Holding no longer applied in light of
Congress’ 2011 amendment to §§ 1391(a) and (c).106 The Federal Circuit

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See generally In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
97. Id. at 1340.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. In 2013, these shipments only accounted for 2% of TC Heartland’s total sales of the accused
products. Id. This small percentage, however, came from 44,707 cases of the accused products amounting
to $331,000 in sales. Id.
102. In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1340. The magistrate judge relied on precedent from the
Federal Circuit in Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp. Id.; see generally Beverly Hills Fan
Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
103. In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1340.
104. Id. at 1340–41.
105. Id. at 1341.
106. Id.

148

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 17:1

rejected this argument.107 The changes Congress made in the amendment as
“relevant to this appeal were minor.”108 If anything, the court stated the
change in § 1391(c) in 2011 was a broadening in its applicability to the rest
of the chapter rather than a narrowing, as TC Heartland had suggested.109
TC Heartland further argued that the change in § 1391(a), particularly
the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” language, renders § 1391
inapplicable to patent infringement cases as § 1400(b) would be
controlling.110 The court rejected that argument as well, finding that
§ 1400(b) does not itself define corporate residency, and thus, there is no
“law” that directly conflicts with § 1391(c) and renders it inapplicable to
patent cases.111 The court also rejected TC Heartland’s argument that
Congress intended to include federal common law in what could otherwise
define corporate residence and preclude § 1391(c)’s applicability to patent
law.112 Despite making this argument, TC Heartland presented no common
law that would define corporate residency.113 The court refused to
incorporate the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco as a law that would
preclude plaintiff’s use of § 1391 for patent infringement venue, reasoning
that § 1391’s congressional history—particularly its 1988 amendment—
coupled with the court’s decision in VE Holding render Fourco inapplicable
to patent cases.114
Regarding specific personal jurisdiction, TC Heartland argued that
the Delaware district court only had specific personal jurisdiction over
claims that arose from the accused products in Delaware—about 2% of TC
Heartland’s total sales.115 TC Heartland argued for the combination of the
Supreme Court’s ruling: that specific personal jurisdiction can only arise
from occurrences or activities taking place in the forum state, and that each
patent infringement gives rise to a separate cause of action, which is clarified
by Federal Circuit case law.116 TC Heartland argued that this logical
combination leads to the conclusion that the Delaware district court only has
jurisdiction over the accused products that TC Heartline directly sent to

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. TC Heartland argued that the “law” already defines corporate residency and that its direct
conflict with § 1391(c) renders § 1391(c) inapplicable to patent infringement cases. Id.
111. Id. at 1342.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1342–43.
115. Id. at 1343.
116. Id.; see also Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (explaining that specific jurisdiction
is dependent on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying case) (citation omitted).
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Delaware.117 The court also rejected this argument, stating that the argument
regarding the connection between proper venue, and that due process was
foreclosed by the court’s decision in Beverly Hills Fan Co.118 Due process
requires a defendant to have minimum contacts with the forum state.119 As
such, due process is satisfied where a non-resident defendant ships accused
products directly to the forum state through an established channel, and
where the claims against the defendant arise from these products.120 The
court denied TC Heartland’s petition for writ of mandamus.121
In re TC Heartland left patent infringement venue jurisdiction as
follows: the general statute § 1391(c) defines corporate residency for
purposes of the specific patent venue statute § 1400(b). Thus, for patent
infringement cases, any corporation can be sued in any forum that has
personal jurisdiction over the corporation. Specific personal jurisdiction over
a corporation can attach if the corporation directly ships infringing products
into the forum district. This standard is generally a low bar to overcome.
A. Stopping the Bullet Train: The VENUE Act
Although the Supreme Court ruled that § 1391(c) defines residency in
§ 1400(b), there is still dispute over whether a broad interpretation of venue
in patent cases is fair.122 Prior to the Court’s decision in In re TC Heartland,
the House of Representatives introduced a bill titled the Innovation Act,
which would amend the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.123 In the
proposed Act, the bill-writers included inter alia an amendment to § 1400(b)
that more expressly defined venue for patent cases.124 The venue amendment
of the Act sought to limit districts where a plaintiff may bring a patent suit.125

117. In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1343.
118. Id. TC Heartland did not challenge jurisdiction under Delaware’s long-arm statute, and thus,
the court assumed that TC Heartland was challenging jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. Id. at n.3; see also Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558,
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that purposeful minimum contacts with the forum state ensures that
out-of-state defendant’s 14th Amendment due process rights are not violated).
119. In re TC Heartland, 821 at 1344.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1345.
122. See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. S1591-01 (introducing a bill to ensure that venue in patent cases is
“fair and proper”).
123. See Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
124. See id. This is one of two comprehensive patent reform acts recently introduced in Congress
and includes amendments to a large portion of title 35 of the United States Code. Id. The other is the
Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act, which suffered a similar fate. See
Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015) (detailing the
PATENT Act, a bipartisan comprehensive patent reform effort).
125. See H.R. 9 § 3.
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Despite early favor for this Act and its many provisions, opposition within
Congress, echoed by interested parties, stalled the Innovation Act at the end
of the 2015 term.126
Even with the Innovation Act and other comprehensive patent reform
acts stalled, legislators are attempting to make progress in controlling NPEs
through smaller, narrower bills that limit different aspects of NPE
behavior.127 For example, the Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL)
Act aims to provide protection from “abusive” demand letters sent from
NPEs.128 Another is the Trade Protection Not Troll Protection (TPTP) Act
whose goal is to reduce the amount of complaints filed by NPEs in the
International Trade Commission.129
Similarly, Senators Jeff Flake, Cory Gardner, and Mike Lee introduced
a bill that focused solely on the patent venue issue—the Venue Equity and
Non-Uniformity Elimination (VENUE) Act—in March of 2016 as an
attempt to narrow proper venue for patent infringement.130 Although this bill
is still in the early stages of the legislative process, it proposes several
measures to limit venue in patent cases to what the senators deemed “fair and
proper.”131 The bill suggests the removal and replacement of § 1400(b) with
specific language that sets forth requirements for venue in patent
infringement cases.132 Among these requirements, subsection (b)(5) seems
to be aimed at reducing litigation initiated by NPEs in plaintiff-friendly
jurisdictions such as the Eastern District of Texas.133 It sets out three

126. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-235 (2015). The Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship
held hearings regarding the Innovation Act in February of 2016, but no further action has since been
taken.
See
All
Actions
H.R.
9-114th
Congress
(2015–2016),
CONGRESS;
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/9/allactions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr9%22%5D%7D&r=1&overview=closed#tabs
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2016).
127. See, e.g., Trade Protection Not Troll Protection Act, H.R. 4829, 114th Cong. (2016); Targeting
Rogue and Opaque Letters Act, H.R. 2045, 114th Cong. (2015).
128. See H.R. 2045 (allowing courts to impose sanctions or reduced damages if parties have
improperly sent demand letters and subjecting non-compliant parties to penalties under the Federal Trade
Commission).
129. See H.R. 4829 § 3(a)(1) (requiring that, to show an affected industry, the complainant may not
rely on the activities of its licensees unless the license “leads to the adoption and development of articles”
that integrate of the patent claimed).
130. See 162 CONG. REC. S1591-01; see also Venue Equality and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act,
S. 2733 (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 17, 2016).
131. See 162 CONG. REC. S1591-01; see also S. 2733
132. See S. 2733.
133. See id. The full amendment proposed states:
(b) Notwithstanding subsections (b) and (c) of section 1391, any civil action for
patent infringement or any action for a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid
or not infringed may be brought only in a judicial district(1) where the defendant has its principal place of business or is incorporated;
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instances where a venue is proper in the jurisdiction which “a party” has
established a physical facility.134 This section of the proposed amendment
requires that the party actually uses the physical facility in a significant way
related to the patent involved in the suit.135 This requirement seems to be
aimed at preventing NPEs from using scarcely-utilized facilities to establish
venue in desirable forums.136
Adjusting § 1400(b) to limit unwanted NPE litigation behavior in this
fashion does not come without risks of unfairly prejudicing plaintiffs and
further complicating venue laws for patent infringement. Evaluating the
current and proposed venue statutes is essential to reaching an answer that
will minimize these risks, while still achieving fairness for all parties
involved in this type of litigation.
III.

EVALUATING THE HIGHWAY: ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT
AND PROPOSED VENUE LAWS

A. But First, the Other Roads: Other Special Venue Statutes and
Their Functionality
The issue remains between those that want to legislatively narrow venue
for patent cases and those that believe that the Supreme Court’s holding in
In re TC Heartland was correct.137 To analyze whether venue should be so
(2) where the defendant has committed an act of infringement of a patent in suit
and has a regular and established physical facility that gives rise to the act of
infringement;
(3) where the defendant has agreed or consented to be sued in the instant action;
(4) where an inventor named on the patent in suit conducted research or
development that led to the application for the patent in suit;
(5) where a party has a regular and established physical facility that such party
controls and operates, not primarily for the purpose of creating venue, and has(A) engaged in management of significant research and development of an
invention claimed in a patent in suit prior to the effective filing date of the patent;
(B) manufactured a tangible product that is alleged to embody an invention claimed
in a patent in suit; or
(C) implemented a manufacturing process for a tangible good in which the process
is alleged to embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit; or
(6) in the case of a foreign defendant that does not meet the requirements of
paragraph (1) or (2), in accordance with section 1391(c)(3).
Id.
See S. 2733.
See id.
See generally id.
Compare BILL FOSTER, BIPARTISAN BICAMERAL GROUP HIGHLIGHTS BROAD OPPOSITION TO
SWEEPING ANTI-PATENT LEGISLATION MOVING THROUGH CONGRESS (July 14, 2015),
https://foster.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/bipartisan-bicameral-group-highlights-broad134.
135.
136.
137.
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broad as to allow what some call “forum shopping,” it is helpful to study
other special venue statutes and the situations that they arise in.138 Five
different special venue statutes—four of which are from the same title as
§ 1400(b) and § 1391(c)—are compared here: 28 U.S.C. § 1394; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1396; 28 U.S.C. § 1398; 28 U.S.C. § 1401; and 15 U.S.C. § 15.
In suits by national banks to enjoin the Comptroller of Currency from
certain actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1394 states that such civil actions may be
brought in the judicial district where the banking association is located.139
The Office of the Comptroller of Currency is a bureau within the United
States Department of the Treasury that regulates and supervises national
banks, and may take supervisory actions against national banks that do not
comply with federal regulations.140 Thus, national banks and thrifts can bring
suits to enjoin the Comptroller from imposing these sanctions if the actions
might be oppressive in the district where they are located.141
In civil actions for the collections of internal revenue taxes, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1396 governs venue.142 Under this statute, venue is proper in one of three
districts: (1) where the tax liability accrues, (2) where the taxpayer resides,
or (3) where the income tax return was filed.143 These suits are generally
brought by the government to recover taxes from a taxpayer or an amount
erroneously refunded out of income taxes.144 Section 1396 is a permissive
grant of venue where the United States is attempting to collect taxes, but does
not override the venue given in a particular statute when that statute gives an
independent basis for venue.145 Such a section is intended to broaden the

opposition-to-sweeping-anti. (stating that “‘[The Innovation Act] would be destructive to our innovation
economy’”), with Shearman & Sterling LLP, The VENUE Act: Removing the Eastern District of Texas’
Stronghold, LEXOLOGY (May 13, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0b4ee7d70c4b-4c6e-801a-3ec6679ab393 (finding reasoning that “[the Innovation Act] would serve to balance
patent cases more evenly across the courts of the United States.”).
138. See generally Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases:
Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 67 (2010).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1394 (1948).
140. Mission, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
141. First Nat’l Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504, 508 (1920) (stating that national banks can bring
suit to enjoin the Comptroller “from doing certain things under color of his office declared to be
threatened, unlawful, arbitrary and oppressive”).
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1396 (1948).
143. Id.
144. See id.; see also United States v. Frost Lumber Indus., Inc. 48 F.2d 285, 285 (W.D. La. 1931).
145. See United States v. Stone, 59 F.R.D. 260, 264 (D. Del. 1973) (holding that § 1396 is not
mandatory and does not restrict venue in suit under 26 U.S.C. § 7403).

2017

OF VENUE, TROLLS, AND THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

153

selection of proper venues available that the United States can bring a suit to
collect taxes.146
In civil actions to enforce, suspend, or set aside the Interstate Commerce
Commission’s orders, proper venue is outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1398.147 This
statute limits venue to judicial districts in which either party in the action
resides or, for businesses, where they have their principal office.148 The
purpose of this venue statute is to prevent separate suits in each state where
any defendants might have resided.149 This statute does not apply to venue
for suits under 49 U.S.C. § 16 to recover damages; it is only applicable to
suits regarding Interstate Commerce Commission orders.150
In shareholders’ derivative actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1401 dictates that
proper venue is in the judicial district where “the corporation might have
sued the same defendants.”151 These actions are typically brought by
stockholders or shareholders against the officers or directors of the
corporation for violating the officers’ or directors’ fiduciary duty to the
corporation.152 These cases are unique situations in corporate law, as the
officers or directors are responsible for bringing and defending the
corporation against lawsuits instead of the shareholders.153 The corporation
itself is a party to these suits as the right to sue rests with the corporation
rather than the shareholders.154 As such, special procedural rules, including
a special venue statute, allow for the corporation’s interests to be protected
from harm from its officers.155
In anti-trust matters, 15 U.S.C. § 15 states that venue is proper in
districts where the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent and can bring
a suit without respect to the amount in controversy.156 Courts have found that
the specific statute supplements the general venue statute found in 28 U.S.C.

146. See id. at 264 (explaining that if § 1396 restricted venue, it would “substantially emasculate the
efficacy” of other statutes such as 26 U.S.C. § 7403).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1398 (1992).
148. See id.
149. United States v. United States Freight Co., 80 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D.C.N.Y. 1947).
150. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Anderson-Tully Co., 256 U.S. 408, 413 (1921).
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1948).
152. See Derivative Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
153. See, e.g., Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code 21.401 (West through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 141 (West through 80 L. 2016).
154. See generally Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970) (explaining that the shareholder has
a right to sue on behalf of the corporation to recover damages for the corporation’s cause of action against
the third party).
155. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (allowing shareholders to bring derivative actions on behalf of the
corporation in a venue “where the corporation might have sued the same defendants”).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
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§ 1391.157 Courts reasoned that the congressional intent behind this statute
was to broaden the plaintiff’s choices for venue and allow recovery for harms
done by the defendants.158
Each of these unique situations requires a special venue statute, rather
than simply relying on § 1391, to protect the interests of the parties or handle
the potential conflict that can arise from the situation.159 These instances
typically involve either a government entity or a potentially unconstitutional
conflict, and thus merit a venue statute that can circumvent possible
injustice.160 Cases that can properly function and protect the parties’ rights
with the general venue statute, however, do not necessitate a special venue
statute. To determine whether § 1400(b) is necessary and effective, we must
evaluate its language and the peculiarity of the situations in which patent
infringement cases arise.
B. Road Construction: The Difference Between § 1400(b) and
the Other Special Venue Statutes
The language in § 1400(b) is similar to some of the aforementioned
statutes and dissimilar to others.161 The similarities and differences in the
language and situations in which these special venue statutes arise are the
basis for reaching a solution in defining the scope of venue in patent cases.
To begin, the term “resides” in § 1400(b), defined by § 1391(c) according to
In re TC Heartland, is a key focus point in venue debates.162 Among the other
special venue statutes, 15 U.S.C. § 15 and 28 U.S.C. § 1396 use a variation
of this word.163 To reiterate, § 15 was held to be supplemental to the general
venue statute § 1391, and is intended to broaden the available venues in

157. See Go-Video Inc., v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Grappone,
Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 133 (D.N.H. 1975)) (stating that the “‘special anti-trust
venue statute is supplemented by general venue statute’”).
158. See Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 206 (1966) (stating that there is no legislative intent
behind the specific venue statute that prevents the “natural reading” of the general and specific venue
statutes together).
159. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1401.
160. See, e.g., id. §§ 1396, 1401.
161. Compare id. § 1400(b) (1999) (stating that venue is proper where a defendant resides or where
the infringement occurred and the defendant has “a regular and established place of business”), with id.
§ 1394 (1948) (stating that venue is proper “where such association is located”), and id. § 1396 (stating
that venue is proper in “the district of the taxpayer’s residence”), and id. § 1398 (stating that venue is
proper “only in a judicial district in which any of the parties bringing the action resides”), and 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (stating that venue is proper in a district where the “defendant resides or is found or has an agent”).
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b); see also In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
163. See 15 U.S.C. § 15; 28 U.S.C. § 1396.
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which a plaintiff can bring suit.164 Similarly, § 1396 is meant to be a
permissive grant of additional proper venues for the United States to bring
suit.165 In a similar manner, § 1400(b) does broaden venue in patent cases to
include districts where the defendant committed infringing acts and has an
established place of business.166 This interpretation broadens venue in much
the same way as § 1396. In light of these similarities and no clear legislative
intent to the contrary, there appears to be no reason for § 1400(b) not to be
held as supplemental to and broaden the general venue statute § 1391(c).
Statutory interpretation, however, is not the only means of evaluating
the purpose and utility of § 1400(b). There is a difference between the
aforementioned venue statutes and § 1400(b) in the way that the relevant
causes of action arise. Collecting taxes and rebutting enforcement of
Interstate Commerce Commission orders involve specific government
workings that differ from typical civil suits. Shareholder’s derivative actions
involve persons bringing suits that normally do not do so. These suits are
distinctly different than the typical plaintiff-defendant suit. Patent
infringement suits are brought by entities that have normally have legal right
to bring suit and involve the awarding of damages or injunctive relief.167
Anti-trust suits are the most closely related to patent infringement, yet courts
have held that the specific venue statute governing those suits are
supplemental to the general venue statute.168 The purpose behind the
supplementation, as courts have said, was to broaden the plaintiff’s choices
when attempting to attain relief.169 Patent infringement, on the other hand, is
much closer to a tortious property action.170 In many ways, patent
infringement is akin specifically to either conversion or trespass.171 The
infringer “takes” property that does not belong to the infringer and uses it.
Although the patent owner retains “possession” of the patent, the patent

164. See Go-Video Inc., v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1989); see generally Pure
Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
165. See United States v. Stone, 59 F.R.D. 260, 264 (D. Del. 1973).
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
167. See generally id. §§ 271, 283, 284; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010); id. § 283 (1952); id. § 284
(2012).
168. See Go-Video Inc., 885 F.2d at 1412; see also Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403
F. Supp. 123, 133 (D.N.H. 1975).
169. See generally Pure Oil Co., 384 U.S. at 202.
170. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention” infringes on the patent), with O’CONNOR’S, TEXAS CAUSES OF ACTION Ch. 6 §
1.1 (stating that for conversion, the plaintiff must show that “the defendant wrongfully exercised
dominion or control over the property”).
171. See 15 TEX. JUR. 3d Conversion § 1 (stating that conversion is the unlawful exercise of
dominion over another’s property inconsistent with the other’s rights); see also 70 TEX. JUR. 3d Trespass
to Realty § 1 (stating that an invasion on a property right is a trespass).
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owner loses benefits from the “converted” property rights. Common relief
for these torts includes monetary damages for the property lost and
injunctions to prevent future trespass.172 These are also the types of relief
available to patent owners for patent infringement.173
With patent infringement’s similarity to tort law, the distinction that
justifies special venue statutes in shareholders derivative suits, suits to
collect taxes, or to cease an order from the Interstate Commerce
Commissioner is not present in patent infringement suits. Patent
infringement suits arise from tortious action between two parties seeking
normal forms of relief in court. Despite this, there is still concern that the
general venue statute is unfair.174 This unease resonates in the VENUE
Act.175
C. Pushing the Limits: How the VENUE Act is Pushing the
Boundaries
1. “I Think You Are In My Seat”: Imposing On the Plaintiffs
The VENUE Act attempts to balance “fairness” for all parties involved
in a suit. In doing so, however, the act is imposing restrictions on all
plaintiffs, not just the NPEs targeted by the act. This conclusion is readily
evidenced by the language of the act itself.176 By simply using the phrase
“party” in subsection (b)(5), the act does not limit the restrictions proposed
in this subsection to NPEs.177 This is a restriction that has not and need not
be placed on already-injured parties.
To address the VENUE Act’s apprehension regarding fairness in patent
infringement suits, fairness for defendants is established by making venue
proper only in jurisdictions where the forum has personal jurisdiction over
the parties.178 If a defendant corporation avails itself of a judicial district’s
jurisdiction, either by operating physical facilities or merely shipping
172. See 15 TEX. JUR. 3d Conversion § 55 (stating that remedies for conversion include the value of
the property or the property’s return and damages for loss of the property’s use); see also 70 TEX. JUR.
3d Trespass to Realty § 22 (stating that the owner of a property may recover damages for trespass); 70
TEX. JUR. 3d Trespass to Realty § 28 (stating that a property owner may recover injunctive relief for
trespass).
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (granting courts the power to award injunctive relief against an infringing
party); see also id. § 284 (allowing the court to award compensatory and treble punitive damages for
patent infringement).
174. See generally In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
175. See 162 CONG. REC. S1591-01; see also Venue Equality and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act,
S. 2733, 114th Cong. (2016) (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 17, 2016).
176. See S. 2733.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1344.
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products into the district, it should be reasonable for the corporation to expect
that it can be sued in that district.
Likewise, limiting proper venue for a plaintiff only to districts where
the plaintiff has a physical facility—as proposed in the Innovation and
VENUE Acts—pushes a boundary of fairness that need not be pushed. When
a plaintiff brings a suit in a district, the plaintiff consents to the jurisdiction
of the district and impliedly concedes that the venue is proper.179 The
proposed subsection (b)(5) of either proposed act places a requirement for
venue on the plaintiff that is not traditionally seen.180 This section states that
the venue must be proper for the plaintiff in the same way that it would be
proper for the defendant. It further states that the plaintiff’s consent alone is
not enough to establish venue.181 For four of the six subsections of the
proposed amendment found in the VENUE Act, the bill explicitly refers to
the defendants in some fashion, whereas, in subsection (b)(5), the
amendment refers to a “party” when setting the enumerated limitations.182
The change in wording for subsection (b)(5) seems to suggest that this
provision is specifically aimed at the plaintiff rather than the defendant.183
More specifically, this provision is likely aimed at NPEs.184 Subsection
(b)(5) of the proposed amendments sets out requirements that involve
substantial use of the physical facility in the development or manufacturing
of the disputed patent.185 As most NPEs are shell companies, they do not
normally have physical facilities that operate in a way that could satisfy the
new provision, effectively limiting the jurisdictions available for them to
bring suit.186 Although this could be effective in restraining certain NPEs, it
also shifts the lines of fairness away from injured plaintiffs and imposes yet
another burden that they must bear. As such, any solution that Congress
adopts to inhibit NPEs also needs to protect other plaintiffs.
179. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581–82 (2013)
(explaining that “plaintiffs are ordinarily allowed to select whatever forum they consider most
advantageous (consistent with jurisdictional and venue limitations)”).
180. See Venue Equality and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act, S. 2733 (setting requirements for
proper venue for the plaintiff); see also Shearman & Sterling LLP, The VENUE Act: Removing the
Eastern
District
of
Texas’
Stronghold,
LEXOLOGY,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0b4ee7d7-0c4b-4c6e-801a-3ec6679ab393 (last visited
Nov. 7, 2016) (explaining how two provisions of the VENUE Act would affect the plaintiff in patent
infringement cases).
181. See S. 2733; see also Shearman & Sterling LLP, supra note 180.
182. See S. 2733.
183. See id. Additionally, venue is proper according to this amendment in a district that the defendant
agrees to be sued in. See id. This effectively eliminates the defendant from the possible parties subject to
subsection (b)(5). See generally id.
184. See S. 2733.
185. See id.
186. See Shell Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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2. Wasn’t That the Conductor’s Job?: The VENUE Act and the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Role
A second boundary that the VENUE Act attempts to redefine is to
include declaratory judgments in its proposed § 1400(b).187 Venue for suits
seeking declaratory judgments stating that a defendant was infringing on a
patent or declaratory judgments stating a patent’s invalidity or
noninfringement is governed by § 1391(c) rather than § 1400(b).188
Understandably, the inclusion of these types of claims attempts to unify all
patent cases under one venue statute. However, including suits for a
declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid would further complicate
lawsuits in district courts.
On the contrary, venue for suits relating to the validity of a patent is
most proper at the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB) and subsequently at the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.189 The PTAB is responsible for conducting post-grant
proceedings and inter partes review.190 The purpose of these proceedings is
to allow a third party the opportunity to challenge the validity of one, several,
or all claims in a patent after the patent was issued.191 In particular, inter
partes review does not have a statute of limitations that would prevent a
challenger seeking a declaratory judgment regarding a patent’s validity at the
PTAB.192 The PTAB is comprised of administrative patent judges who are
technically trained and have knowledge of patent law.193 It would be unfair
187. See S. 2733.
188. See Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v Watkins, 373 F.2d 326, 326 (4th Cir. 1964) (explaining that
venue in actions seeking declaratory judgment involving invalidity or noninfringement were governed by
§ 1391(c)); see also Am. Chem. Paint Co. v Dow Chem. Co., 161 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1947)
(explaining that § 1391 governed actions for declaratory judgment involving patent construction).
189. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(4) (2011).
190. See id. § 6(b)(4). Inter partes review is a trial proceeding to determine the patentability of one
or more claims in a patent under §§ 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103 conducted by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
in the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Inter Partes Review, UNITED STATES PATENT &
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patentdecisions/trials/inter-partes-review (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). Post grant proceedings are trial
proceedings to determine the patentability of claims in a patent under id. §§ 282(b)(2) or 282(b)(3). Post
Grant Review, UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patentsapplication-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/post-grant-review (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
191. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2013) (detailing the purpose and procedure for an inter partes review
proceeding); see also id. § 321 (2011) (detailing the purpose and procedure that a post-grant review
proceeding must follow).
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (stating that a petition for inter partes review can be filed nine months
after the patent was filed or at the termination of a post-grant review proceeding but with no explicit end
date).
193. See id. § 6(a) (stating that the PTAB is to be comprised of the Director, Deputy Director,
Commissioner of Patents, Commissioner of Trademarks, and administrative patent judges); see also
Jennifer R. Bush, Administrative Patent Judges: Not Your Typical Federal Judge, FENWICK & WEST LLP
(July 10, 2014), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/administrative-patent-judges-not-your-
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to the plaintiff—even possibly the defendant—to allow venue for these
issues in a court that does not require as high a level of technical expertise as
the PTAB to decide the technical validity of a patent.
The unjust conditions that could be imposed on plaintiffs—the
already-injured parties who are seeking relief—outweighs the possibility of
deterring NPEs from the favorable litigation conditions in the Eastern
District of Texas. Preserving a plaintiff’s right to choose a venue is
invaluable; however, so is restraining undesirable NPE behavior. A solution
that does both is ideal.
IV.

THE GPS SYSTEM: A GUIDE TO THE ROAD AHEAD

A two-part solution that maintains venue fairness for plaintiffs and
reduces aggressive NPE behavior exists. The first part of the solution to the
patent infringement venue conflict is simply for Congress to repeal
§ 1400(b). Although seemingly drastic, removing subsection (b) makes
sense for two reasons: (1) patent infringement is, in essence, a tort against
property, and (2) the circumstances that likely gave rise to § 1400(b)’s
enactment no longer apply. The second part of the solution is to incentivize
operating companies to attain patent portfolios before NPEs or encourage
inventors to sell their patents to operating companies.
A. “Redirecting . . . :” Adjusting the Route, Justly
1. Is This the Wrong Map?: Maybe Patent Infringement Is Not
That Special
Patents are a claim of ownership over an individual’s idea for a useful,
novel creation. Patent infringement, then, is essentially a conversion or
trespass to chattel for a protected form of intangible property. Simply put,
patent infringement is someone taking someone else’s property and using it
without permission. This type of malicious act does not warrant the creation
and enforcement of special venue or procedural rules to protect the patent
owner any more than a conversion of tangible personal property does.
Special procedural statutes need only arise in situations where the general
statutes fail to protect the fairness of litigation and maintain the integrity of
the parties’ rights.194 This is why § 1396 is effective, as it is unfair for every

typical-federal-judge.aspx (indicating that the hiring criteria for an administrative patent judge includes
both technical and law degrees).
194. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1394 (1948), 1396 (1948), 1398 (1992), 1401 (1948).
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taxpayer to defend a suit against the IRS at the IRS’ home forum.195 This
statute allows for taxpayers to defend themselves in a forum that is of
reasonable cost to them, both financially and temporally. Defending a
lawsuit against a government entity like the IRS is an atypical situation.
Defending a tort is not.
2. Who Needs A Map When You Have A GPS?
Any attempt to find the solution for the tension between § 1391 and
§ 1400(b) must consider the reason Congress passed § 1400(b) in 1897. The
reason behind § 1400(b) can be inferred, however, from the circumstances
at the time of enactment. The 1897 Act was passed towards the end of the
Gilded Age.196 It is likely that Congress was attempting to protect businesses
from patent infringement litigation in venues that would be fundamentally
unfair. This unfairness is due, not from the characteristics of the venue itself,
but from the burden on a business caused by litigating in such a distant forum
from its intended market. This was likely caused by the presence of a stray
product in the stream of commerce. Transporting attorneys, witnesses,
documents, inventors, and experts at the time could have proven to be a
significant expense. The wording in § 1400(b) that states “regular and
established place of business” prevents that.197 However, subsequent
amendments to § 1400 only affected § 1400(a), the copyrights portion of the
statute, rather than § 1400(b).198 As such, the wording remains the same as
when it was first enacted: “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business.”199
A business incorporated in the United States defending a patent
infringement suit in any venue within the U.S. no longer faces the challenges
that companies faced over a century ago. The technological strides humanity
has made since the turn of the 20th century have enabled companies to
promote and sell their products on a global market with a great amount of
ease. Gone are the days where salespeople travel door-to-door selling

195. See generally id. § 1396.
196. The Gilded Age refers to a point in American history ranging from the 1870s to about 1900.
This era represented a dramatic growth in industry in the United States economy that spurred demand for
better transportation.
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999).
198. See 102 Stat. 4671 (1988) (amending § 1400(a) to include “or exclusive rights in mask words”);
see also 112 Stat. 2917 (1998) (amending § 1400(a) to include “or designs”); 113 Stat. 223 (1999)
(amending the title of § 1400 to read “§ 1400. Patents and copyrights, mask works, and designs”).
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
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products, and where trains are the fastest mode of transportation. In this
modern age, defending a suit in a distant forum is no longer a greater burden
on a company’s finances or time than defending one in their home judicial
district. The protections that Congress may have given defendants via
§ 1400(b) are no longer necessary.
This is not to say, however, that any company can and should
reasonably expect to defend a patent infringement suit in any venue. Fairness
must still be a priority. The due process clause of the 14th Amendment
ensures this. As stated in Beverly Hills Fan, a defendant’s minimum contacts
with the forum state adequately protect a defendant’s interests involving
venue in a lawsuit.200 As such, the only relevant inquiry to decide whether
venue is proper is to ask whether the defendant had sufficient minimum
contacts with a forum such as the Eastern District of Texas. If the defendant
does not have sufficient contacts in the Eastern District of Texas, the court
does not have personal jurisdiction and venue is improper.
B. Dealing With the Unruly Passengers
The reason behind the new wave of patent reform, at least the reforms
focused on in this writing, is not an emerging issue with established
procedures but rather an issue with the types of parties involved in the suit.
The problem that these reforms are attempting to correct is potentially unjust
behaviors by NPEs. As previously stated, there are different types of NPEs
that use patents.201 There are research and development NPEs, such as
universities, that license their patents to fund further research. The behavior
that influenced these proposed reforms come from NPEs that are shell
companies. These NPEs do not conduct research and patent their own work,
but rather purchase a patent portfolio that has several patents. Once this type
of NPE has this portfolio, they search for operating companies that are
possibly infringing on one of the patents and threaten a lawsuit. This “wait
and see” behavior, along with aggressive enforcement tactics, is the concern
of most current patent reform legislation.
The second part of the proposed two-part solution addresses this
behavior. Once § 1400(b) is repealed, an incentive needs to be created for
inventors to assign their patents to operating companies rather than NPEs.
Additionally, operating companies should have priority in purchasing patent
portfolios. The concept behind this part of the solution is simple. If nonresearch NPEs cannot attain patents, then they are unable to employ such

200.
201.

See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
See discussion supra Part II.A .
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aggressive enforcement tactics that can hamper the productive use of the
patents.
Creating incentives for inventors to assign their patents to operating
companies is key to solving the current dilemma involving NPEs and venue.
These incentives need only be marginal. The proposed course of action is
allowing for a below-the-line deduction for the sale of the patent to a
qualified entity. The reasoning behind this proposal is analogous to the
reason behind charitable contributions deduction; to incentivize behavior
that benefits society as a whole. Similar to the charitable contributions
section of the tax code, this patent sale deduction can be limited to a
percentage of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income where the excess is
treated as a sale in the following taxable years.202 Tax deductions for
charitable donations were instituted when the War Revenue Act of 1917
passed.203 The purpose behind this deduction was to allow charities to
survive the on-going war.204 The authors of the act feared that, with the recent
increase in income tax, wealthy donors would stop making charitable
contributions.205 To curb this potential behavior, the charitable donation
deduction was created.206 This type of tax incentive has proven effective, as
$373 billion was donated to qualifying charities in 2015 alone.207 A tax
deduction like this could be sufficient to influence inventors to sell their
patents to operating companies rather than NPEs. An above-the-line
deduction for a percentage of the patents’ sale price to a qualified entity could
also be entertained. To become a qualified entity, a company would only
need to apply for the status with the IRS.
To give operating companies priority, a patent sale system could be
implemented online. A government-run website could allow patent owners
to offer their patents for sale at a listed price. Operating companies would
register with whichever government entity runs the website, likely the United
States Patent and Trademark Office or the IRS. Once registered, the
companies will have priority to view and purchase patents and patent
portfolios over entities that have not registered. Giving operating companies

202.
203.

See I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (e) (2016).
The Interesting History of the U.S. Charitable Contribution Deduction, STRATEGIC WEALTH
PLANNING, http://awealthplan.com/the-interesting-history-of-the-us-charitable-contribution-deduction/
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Giving
Statistics,
CHARITY
NAVIGATOR,
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm/bay/content.view/cpid/42# (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
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priority alone could also solve the issue but to a lesser extent. This would
work best when used in conjunction with the incentive to the inventors.
This two-part solution resolves the debate over whether patent
infringement venue laws are too broad. It addresses the core concern behind
much of the patent reform in Congress today, the non-research type NPEs,
while eliminating the tension between conflicting statutes.
V.

THE END OF THE ROAD: CONCLUDING THE JOURNEY

Patent infringement venue laws and NPEs have been the center of a
passionate debate for several years. A significant portion of legislation
involving patent law has been aimed at limiting certain types of NPEs by
imposing unnecessary restrictions on other types of plaintiffs.208 Courts have
attempted to resolve this conflict, but there still existed strong opposition to
these decisions, regardless of which side the judgments favored. The issues
that revolve around NPEs, including the conflicting venue statutes, can only
be resolved by Congress. Although there are many proposed bills attempting
to pass, they impose restrictions that need not be imposed. This attempt at
comprehensive patent reform to contain NPEs that senators deem
unfavorable may not work. The America Invents Act’s joinder rules did not
hinder the NPE business model nor calm the popularity of the Eastern
District of Texas.209
The reason behind this resilience is simply because the unfavorable
NPE business structure remains intact. Legislation that addresses the core of
this business structure—acquiring vast patent portfolios—rather than
attempting to affect it at other stages is much more likely to succeed. There
is a balance that must be achieved, however, when trying to limit business
practices between achieving a goal to benefit society and not invading
people’s freedom to choosing how to run their businesses. This balance is
why the two-part solution is so effective. If Congress gives inventors a
reason to sell their patents to operating companies rather than NPEs, the
unfavorable NPE business structure will weaken and eventually cease while
preserving a person’s right to choose how to conduct his or her business.
Importantly, this solution also maintains a plaintiff’s right to choose a forum
and venue convenient for them, the injured party seeking justice. Congress
should introduce and pass a bill proposing this two-part solution to preserve
personal liberty and finally resolve the ongoing, costly debate over NPEs.

208.
209.

See discussion supra Part II. D.
See discussion supra Part II. A.

